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UNENUMERATED RIGHTS-SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS, THE NINTH AMENDMENT, AND
JOHN STUART MILL
[I]n ultimate reduction the first object of a free people is
the preservation of their liberty.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Modern technology and an emerging social ethic have placed
unprecedented bounds on the realm of individual liberty. Technology has severely limited the scope of behavior which affects
only the actor. At the same time, overpopulation, mass communications, rapid transportation, and self-destructability have
rendered men more interdependent than ever before. This interdependency makes purely individual behavior almost non-existent
and justifies an ever increasing claim to societal control of individual action for the collective good. As the technological advances
of modern America have provided the pragmatic justification for
greater governmental control of the individual, the social ethic has
provided the philosophic justification. Perhaps in reaction to a
Protestant ethic, which many individuals used as justification
for the exploitation of society, modern America has adopted a social ethic which places the collective welfare of society above the
needs of any individual. The danger today is that the pendulum
will swing too far and individual liberty will be sacrificed in the
name of the collective welfare.
While a government free to act without limitation for the collective good may be democratic, it has no place in our constitutional
scheme. The authors of the Constitution feared a tyranny of
the majority. They believed the collective welfare could only be
secured by insuring the integrity of the individual. The result was
a Constitution which secured certain rights. For the purpose
of this comment these right's include all privileges and immunities
which vest in the individual. The realm of constitutionally protected liberty is considered to be the aggregate of these individual rights.
The same factors which have resulted in greater governmental
control of the individual make it both necessary and difficult for
courts to define constitutionally protected rights. The men of frontier America had the ability to withdraw from society. This generation enjoys no such option. Our "Waldens" must be internalized; rather than withdrawing from an infringement of our liberties, we must assert them and demand the government to with* Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DICK. L. REV. 121,
131 (1960).
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draw. Nevertheless, the consequences of almost every act extend
beyond the actor, thereby more readily justifying governmental
regulation. Ultimately we must look to the Constitution for a resolution of these competing claims between the individual and
the state, and, through judicial interpretation, create a protected
realm of individual liberty.
The United States Constitution established a dichotomy of powers and rights. Powers may be either express or implied and
when the needs of modern society have required governmental regulation the Supreme Court has been able to find an implied
power to act. By adopting the notion of a "living Constitution"
and an expansive interpretation of the necessary and proper clause,1
the Court has kept constitutional powers equal to the needs of
the time. On the other hand, while rights in the Constitution may
be either enumerated or unenumerated, the Court has been most
reluctant to define the latter. This portion of the Constitution
has not "lived"-while the Supreme Court has been quick to find
implied powers, it has been extremely hesitant to find unenumerated rights. Nonetheless, if individual liberty is going to
survive the challenge of modern America, its constitutional status will have to be reexamined in light of contemporary conditions and standards will have to be developed by which the
Court can determine which conduct merits constitutional protection.
Rights and powers do not exist independent of each other.
They must be viewed on a continuum and courts must assume the
difficult role of balancing the competing interests on a case-bycase basis. To accomplish this it is useful to establish a hierarchy
of both rights and powers. Express powers cannot be denied or
enumerated rights assailed, but where implied powers and unenumerated rights clash, no standards are available by which to
resolve the conflict. This comment proposes a constitutional hierarchy of rights. Rights may derive protection by enumeration,
through the ninth amendment or through the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The Supreme Court has always protected enumerated rights
and will, of course, continue to do so, following standards and
guidelines it has established. This comment will confine itself to
the protection of unenumerated rights. Initially, it will explore
the doctrine used in the past to void laws violative of unenumerated rights-substantive due process. Then the ninth amendment
will be suggested as a source of protected behavior, with John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty2 being offered as a criterion for the determination of ninth amendment rights.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gateway

Ed.

1959).
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DUE PROCESS
Advocates of substantive due process contend that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects those rights
which are "fundamental" to a free society. 8 They argue that individuals should be free "from
all substantial arbitrary impositions
'4
and purposeless restraints.
Substantive due process, however, is not widely accepted as a
valid interpretation of the due process clause today. The lack of
workable standards is the reason usually given for its decline. To
many, the power to declare a right "fundamental," and, therefore, constitutionally protected, amounts to judicial amendment
and is beyond the scope of the Court's authority. However, supporters of substantive due process do not believe excessive judicial discretion is a real danger:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The
best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of
the individual, has struck between that liberty and the
demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to
this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational
process, it certainly has not been one where judges have
felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take
them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck
by this country, having regard to what history teaches are
the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.
A decision of this Court which radically departs from it
could not long survive, while a decision which builds on
what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula
could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and
restraint.5
Appealing as this argument might be, the history of substantive due process supports the reservations of its opponents. A capsule history of the doctrine's application will show that the Supreme Court has not always demonstrated restraint.
In Meyer v. Nebraska 6 the United States Supreme Court voided
a Nebraska law prohibiting all schools in the state from teaching
in a foreign language or from teaching foreign languages to students who had not passed the eighth grade. The appellant successfully maintained that he had a constitutional right to practice
his profession which was teaching a foreign language. The Court
II.

SUBSTANTIVE

3. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

4. Id. at 543.

5. Id. at 542.
6. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

NUMBER 3]

UNENUMERATED RIGHTS

stated that "[h] is right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the
liberty of the [fourteenth] Amendment. '7 The Meyer Court summarized other rights which had found fourteenth amendment protection.
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."
Two years later the right to "direct the upbringing and education
of children"9 was held to mean that the state could not force
attendance at public as opposed to private schools. While few
people objected to the results in these cases, dissatisfaction did
result from a parallel series of cases. In Lochner v. New York, 10 the
Supreme Court voided a New York labor law establishing maximum working hours for bakery employees. They placed freedom
of contract on a constitutional plain:
[A] prohibition to enter into any contract of labor in a
bakery for more than a certain number of hours a week, is,
in our judgment, so wholly beside the matter of a proper,
reasonable and fair provision, as to run counter to that
liberty of person and of free contract provided for in the
Federal Constitution. 1
Three Justices felt that the law was a valid exercise of state police
power, and Mr. Justice Holmes felt that the Court had forced
its economic views on the nation through the fourteenth amendment: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics

. .

.[and] a constitution is not intended to

embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and
the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez
12
faire.'
History vindicated Justice Holmes. Subsequent Supreme Court
Justices have recoiled at the prospect of applying the substantive
due process doctrine because of the potential for future Lochners
7. Id. at 400.

8. Id. at 399.
9. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).

10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. Id. at 62.

12. Id. at 75 (dissenting opinion).
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inherent in the doctrine. As a result, other constitutional provisions
have been a source for the protection of personal liberties.
A recent case upholding an unenumerated personal liberty
illustrates the Court's reluctance to use substantive due process to
protect individual liberty. In Griswold v. Connecticut1 3 the Supreme Court recognized a constitutionally protected right to marital privacy. Though the opinions of five Justices 1 4 seemed to be consistent with the substantive due process approach to the fourteenth
amendment, the ogre of another Lochner and the announced belief by several members of the Court in some form of "incorporation"1 5 compelled the Court to find a new doctrine. Justice
Douglas articulated the new approach: "[S] pecific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance ...
Various guarantees create zones of privacy."' 6 Marital privacy
was placed under this constitutional penumbra.
Though a respectable majority of the Griswold Court believed
that marital privacy was constitutionally protected, no viable
doctrine emerged from the case. Justice Stewart pointed out in
dissent:
[T] he Court refers to no less than six Amendments to the
Constitution: the First, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth,
the Ninth, and the Fourteenth. But the Court does not
say which of these Amendments,
if any, it thinks is in7
fringed by this Connecticut law.1
Just as the Justices could not reach a meeting of the minds on
why they were doing what they did, legal commentators cannot
agree on the significance of the decision. Some feel that it is just
one more case in "the main line of development under the substantive rights interpretation of the liberty protected by the due process clause."' 8 Others, however, see it as the possible source of a
new philosophy by which individual rights will be protected.' 9
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. Justices Harlan, White and Goldberg wrote concurring opinions
which appeared to be consistent with the principles of substantive due
process. The Chief Justice and Justice Brennan joined in Goldberg's
opinion.
15. According to the incorporation doctrine, the fourteenth amendment
was meant to incorporate the first eight amendments within itself. See
Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947).
16. 381 U.S. at 484.

This "penumbral" approach satisfies the incorpora-

tionist demand that only those rights spelled out in the first eight amendments are protected by the fourteenth amendment while allowing for the
protection of "fundamental" rights as emanations of the amendments.
17. Id. at 527-28.
18. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental
and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 235, 251 (1965).
19. McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64
MICH. L. REv. 259 (1965).
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Griswold may arguably be seen as both a continuation of those
cases employing the philosophy of substantive due process and a
source of a new methodology for protecting individual liberties
via the ninth amendment. In the future, the Supreme Court should
recognize and protect ninth amendment rights.2 0 Moreover, the
Court should defend lesser rights via the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. These "lesser rights" would include
any individual interest arbitrarily or capriciously infringed upon
by state action.
From a constitutional viewpoint, the relationship between citizens
and a state is different than that between citizens and the federal
government. The federal government is one of enumerated powers and, within its power grant, it is free to act as it will unless
clearly proscribed by another section of the Constitution. If enumeration grants power, omission ought reasonably be construed to
deny it. By omitting powers, the government is denied access to
certain realms of personal behavior. On the other hand, the state's
powers are, from a federal viewpoint, not enumerated. With the
exception of the meager prohibitions of Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution, the states are not expressly denied any authority
over its citizens. Yet the Constitution does recognize a power vested
in the people. The tenth amendment provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people. [Emphasis added]
The fourteenth amendment increased the scope of federal court
review of state laws and this increase has complicated the court's
task. 21 When reviewing a federal statute it is sufficient for a
court to determine if the power to act was granted by the
Constitution and if it was, the law will be upheld unless it infringes on an enumerated right. State powers, however, are not
derived from the Federal Constitution. The state's powers are
nearly absolute by implication and the express rights of the citizens nil. Therefore, if the same test were applied to state enactments, the power would have to be upheld no matter how
blatantly it infringed on individual rights. Thus, federal courts
are confronted with a real dilemma: they must either acknowledge
that the Federal Constitution does not protect an individual from
state action no matter how obnoxious or they must engage in a
balancing of implied powers and unenumerated rights. The
former course would be to nullify the fourteenth amendment.
The latter would constitute a return to substantive due process.
20. The concept of the ninth amendment rights will be developed in
section III of this comment.
21. Prior to the fourteenth amendment, state laws could be challenged

in federal courts under the supremacy clause by claiming they conflicted
with the Federal Constitution, statutes or treaties.
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It might be argued that the balancing of state and citizen
powers and rights should be worked out in the political arena of
the state but that ignores the historic role of the Supreme Court.
The Court created judicial review 22 and it must now live with it.
The fact that the fourteenth amendment complicates the task
does not vitiate the Court's responsibility. The fact that a prior
Court was less self-restrained than it should have been can only be
answered by greater restraint in the present Court. As Arthur
Sutherland put it, referring to the Griswolddecision:
I wish ...

that we might, like Justices Harlan and White,

rely simply on the idea that such a statute as that in Griswold is inconsistent with the undefinable concept of reasonable liberty, which due process of law has come to connote for us and which we must let our nine Justices apply.
we are frank with ourselves,
For this, we must avow when
23
is our constitutional system.

Therefore, when a law is challenged as violative of an individual right which is neither expressly protected in the Constitution,
nor reserved to the people by the ninth amendment, the principles of substantive due process should apply. A court should only
uphold such a law if it is "reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest, and not arbitrary
or capricious in application

.... 24

III. NINTH AMENDMENT
As well as interests protectable under the due process clause,
certain unenumerated rights should be recognized under the ninth
amendment. These rights are of a higher order and require a showing of extreme necessity to justify governmental invasion. While
the amendment's historic application does not support this contention, it does not render it untenable.
25
The ninth amendment was the creation of James Madison.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 135 (1803).
23. Sutherland, Privacy in Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REV. 283, 288 (1965).
See also Kauper, supra note 18, at 258; Kutner, The Neglected Ninth
Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L.
REv. 121, 132 (1967).

24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965)
curring).

(White, J., con-

25. B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DICK. L. REV. 121 (1960); Dunbar,
James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627 (1956);
Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CH.
L. REV. 814 (1966); Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936); Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121
(1967); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People?,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787 (1962); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L.
REV. 787 (1959).
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It was inserted to allay the fears of some that enumerating rights
would have the effect of denying those not listed, while satisfying the demands of others that a declaration of rights be inserted
in the Constitution. The Federalists had felt that a declaration
of rights was needless:
James Wilson summarized the Federalist viewpoint: "[I] t
would have been superfluous and absurd, to have stipulated with a federal body of our own creation, that we
should not enjoy those privileges, of which we are not divested either by the intention
or the act that has brought
2
that body into existence.
Despite Federalist assurances, many of the states remained insist27
ent that a Bill of Rights be adopted.
Madison bowed to the states' demands, and we have a Bill of
Rights which includes the ninth amendment:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.
Several schools of thought have developed over the meaning of
the amendment. Traditionally, it has been considered purely a rule
of construction articulating the assumption that the federal government has no powers which are not granted by the Constitution. 28 Some members of this school also believe the ninth
amendment was inserted to make clear that the government, in
amending the Constitution, was enunciating rather than creating rights. Rights, they contend, exist independent of powers
and the government has the power neither to create nor to dismiss
a right. 29 The common factor to these interpretations is that
they afford no ninth amendment protection of rights.
In summary, whether one reads the history of the ninth
as foreclosing the "imperfect enumeration" theory, or as attempting to avoid future definitional problems, the amendment clearly remains a rule of construction with the
purpose of obviating the possibility of interpreting the first
eight amendments as exclusive. It is not, as its history indicates, 3either
a source or a summary of those unenumerated
0
rights.
A second school also holds the ninth amendment to be a rule of
construction, but one which provides protection for unenumerated
rights:
The Ninth Amendment is not a source of these unenumer26. Kelley, supra note 25, at 817.
27. C. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

1954).
28. Call, supra note 25, at 129-30.
29. Dunbar, supra note 25, at 635, 638.
30. Kelley, supra note 25, at 825.

DEVELOPMENT

42-44 (2d

ed.
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ated rights but points to other parts of the Constitution, particularly the 'due process' clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as the context within which enumerated rights are to be determined
and the means by which
3
they are to be protected. 1
Under this theory, the ninth amendment provides the constitutional basis for substantive due process. The amendment means
that the first eight amendments should be liberally construed so
as to protect unenumerated rights. It does not, however, protect any rights itself. Advocates of this approach consider the
ninth amendment to be the functional equivalent of the necessary
and proper
clause, being to rights what that clause has been to
32
powers.
Others consider the ninth amendment to be a source of protection
for unenumerated rights:
[The ninth amendment] must be a positive declaration of
existing, though unnamed rights, which may be vindicated
under the authority of the Amendment whenever and if
ever any governmental authority shall aspire to '3ungranted
3
power in contravention of "unenumerated rights.
It is considered declaratory of absolute or inherent rights against
which any assertion of power must fail.3 4 Norman Redlich contends that the tenth amendment supports this view.
The last four words of the Tenth Amendment must have
been added to conform its meaning to the Ninth Amendment and to carry out the intent of both-that as to the
federal government there were rights, not enumerated in
the Constitution, which were 'retained . ..by the people,'
and that because the people possessed such rights there
were powers which neither the federal government nor
the states possessed.3 5
Proponents of this view have also suggested that the ninth amendment is to personal rights what the general welfare clause is for
collective or public rights,3 6 viz., Congress can act to defend unenumerated rights with the authority for such action derived from
the ninth amendment. It has even been contended that the amendment applies to the states as well as the federal government directly 3 7 (though not through the fourteenth amendment) and to
the acts of private individuals.3 8
This comment accepts the third view in its least ambitious form.
31.
.32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Kutner, supra note 25, at 135.
Dunbar, supra note 25, at 635.
Kelsey, supra note 25, at 323.
Kelley, supra note 25, at 816.
Redlich, supra note 25, at 807.
B. PATTERSON, supra note 25, at 5.
Id. at 36; Redlich, supra note 25, at 808, 809.
Kutner, supra note 25, at 141.
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Certain unenumerated rights exist which should derive their constitutional protection from the ninth amendment. Naturally, any
law which violates such a right would be void by authority of
the amendment. No position is taken, however, on the more extreme positions that the ninth amendment is itself a grant of governmental power to legislate in favor of unenumerated rights
or that it proscribes certain forms of private behavior.
Several considerations support this position. First, the history
of the amendment does not demand one interpretation. Every
historical survey available centers on the meaning which James
Madison intended the amendment to have.3 9 While the meaning
of the document's author is relevant, it is the intent of the first Congress that is persuasive to the courts. Unfortunately, that intent
is obscure. The House enacted this measure with little debate
and the Senate's proceedings were secret. Perhaps a more ambitious empirical work than this comment will attempt to determine the depth of the individual Congressmen's belief in natural
rights and equate that to the depth of ninth amendment protection. For purposes of this comment, however, it is sufficient to
state that the amendment's history does not compel an interpretation which deprives it of substance.
A second reason for advocating a substantive ninth amendment
is found in its application by the Supreme Court. While the Court
has avoided reading body into the amendment, such an interpretation would have its roots in prior opinions. In United Public
Workers v. Mitchell40 the court stated:
We accept appellant's contention that the nature of political rights reserved to the people by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments are involved. The right claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as4 1a party
official or worker to further his own political views.
The most recent and promising application of the ninth amendment is found in Griswold v. Connecticut.4 2 While Mr. Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion most directly relied on the ninth
amendment, it was in fact used to justify his belief in substantive
due process. 43 Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion offers
more hope for a revival of the amendment. As partial justification for the opinion that marital privacy is constitutionally protected,
Justice Douglas merely states that "[t] he Ninth Amendment provides: . . . -44 and includes the text. Future Courts might use
39. See note 25, supra.
40. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
41. Id. at 94.

42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 197, 207 (1965); Kelley, supra
note 25, at 829-30.

44. 381 U.S. at 484.
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this reminder that there is a ninth amendment as a springboard
from which to elaborate on the substance of the amendment.
Rules of statutory interpretation also favor a substantive ninth
amendment. As a general rule, a statute should not be read so as
to deprive any of its words of meaning. The amendment states that
there are "certain [unenumerated] rights . . . retained by the people." While the Constitution explicitly states that these unenumerated rights of the people exist, the traditional interpretation of the
amendment has shielded these rights from any constitutional protection. It is possible that this terminology was meant only as a rule

of construction limiting governmental powers, but the wording
in itself seems to raise certain unenumerated rights to a constitutional plane. An interpretation which denies the existence of
constitutionally protected unenumerated rights clearly does violence to those words in the Constitution which state that there are
enumerated rights "retained by the people."
A final reason for adopting a substantive approach to the ninth
amendment is found in the nature of the times. Modern technology
has provided the methods of invading the realm of the individual
and modern interdependence has provided the justification for
using the technology. It is no longer sufficient for courts to look
only at the power being exercised to determine if it is justified.
They must also scrutinize any individual interests being infringed:
Protection of . . . the dignity and integrity of the individual . . . has become increasingly important as modern so-

ciety has developed.

All the forces of a technological

age-industrialization, urbanization, and organization-op-

erate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and sup-

port this enclave of private life marks the 45difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.
46
In short, the argument for a ninth amendment renaissance
is four-fold. The amendment's history does not necessarily preclude a substantive interpretation; such an interpretation is not

without precedent; the rules of statutory interpretation favor it;
and, modern society requires a more stable foundation for the protection of personal liberties than the past has provided.
foundation for the future should be the ninth amendment.
IV.

The

JOHN STUART MILL--A STANDARD

Over the years, standards have evolved whereby courts are
able to ascertain whether or not a statute is violative of the due
45. Emerson, Nine Justices In Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV.

219, 229 (1965). See also McKay, supra note 19, at 279.
46. The ninth amendment was "born" when it was enacted but rendered
lifeless by judicial inaction. This comment suggests a "rebirth" by judicial recognition.
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process clause.4 7 If, as this comment suggests, there is to be a higher
order of rights protected by the ninth amendment, standards will
have to be developed to determine which rights are favored. John
Stuart Mill provides such a standard in his essay On Liberty.4
Initially, it should be made clear that Mill's philosophy is not
offered as an absolute or exclusive criterion for the determination
of ninth amendment rights. 49 It is offered rather as a standard
which will raise a presumption that an interest is protected.
It is Mill's lack of originality which renders his work a useful
tool in the determination of which rights are protected by the
ninth amendment. The Court is not asked to adopt a philosophy
more desirable than that of the authors of the Constitution but
rather to apply a very clear statement of the philosophy which
prompted the ninth amendment. Russell Kirk refers to On Liberty as follows:
Some books form the character of their age; others reflect it;
and Mill's Liberty is of the latter order. . . . As Mill himself was the last of the distinguished line of British empiricists, so his Liberty, with its foreboding remarks on
the despotism of the masses, was more an epilogue to middle-class liberalism than a rallying-cry. 0
While Mr. Justice Black's objection in Griswold to the application of standards based on "natural justice" 51 might appeal to an
age which does not accept that concept, it does not obviate the5 2fact
If
that the men who authored the Constitution did believe in it.
the Court is going to protect rights which the framers of the
Constitution meant to be protected, it must deal with "natural" or
"inherent" rights no matter how difficult it might be in the
modern milieu. 53 It is particularly this modern inability to treat
natural law concepts that makes a work like Mill's valuable. It provides workable criteria for determining which rights were considered protectable by the authors of the Constitution.
Mill's application of his philosophy is of little value today. The
fact situation in Mill's time was not the same as the framer's time
nor is it the same as the present. Nevertheless, his concepts have
retained their vitality:
[T]here is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect
interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's
life and conduct which affects only himself, or if it also
47. See text accompanying notes 3-24 supra.
48. J.MILL, supra note 2.
49. Also, this comment does not suggest that the amendment was meant
to embody Mill's philosophy.

50. Kirk, Introductionto J. MILL ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at vii.
51. 381 U.S. at 522 (dissenting opinion).
52. Kelley, supra note 25, at 816.
53. Call, supra note 25, at 121.
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affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance; for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself.
• . . This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty,
It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological ...
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as
may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even
though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse,
or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual,
follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining
being 5supposed
to be of full age, and not forced or de4
ceived.
Capsulized, Mill's philosophy is that a person of sound mind and
proper age is free to do what he will privately, either individually
or in concert with others, short of harming another. It can not
be too strongly stated that Mill did not offer this as a simplistic
measure of rights and that he was aware that liberty could
only be preserved by balancing collective rights with individual rights. There is little behavior which is purely either collective or individual and the preservation of liberty is dependent
on the establishment of a wise balance between the competing interests. It is this balancing which the ninth amendment
requires.
A court in applying these standards will have to resolve three
questions. First, does the challenged regulation only affect the
behavior of competent adults? Second, does the law limit the ability of the individual to shape his conscience or plan his life?
Third, does the behavior which the law attempts to modify affect others than the actor? If there is an affirmative answer to
the first two questions, and a negative to the last, the presumption
that the statute is constitutional would fall and the burden would
shift to the state to prove that the infringement of the ninth
amendment right is justified by a compelling state interest.
Thus, a law which infringes upon a right protected by the ninth
amendment would undergo the same judicial scrutiny as one violative of a first amendment right.5 5 In addition to a showing of
54. J. MILL, supra note 2, at 17-18.
55. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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necessity, the government should be allowed to defeat a ninth
amendment claim by showing a long tradition of prohibition or
regulation. While the framers of the Constitution generally believed in the concept of liberty later defined by Mill, it cannot be
presumed that they meant to void laws which had historic standing in common law nations.
Though Mill has never been adopted as a source of constitutional protection, the frequently heralded right to "privacy" often appears to be a synonym for Mill's "liberty." In Olmstead v.
United States,56 Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, declared that:
[t] he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found
in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and
5 7
the right most valued by civilized men.
Since Olmstead it has often been suggested that privacy stands
on a constitutional plane. 58 In Griswold the very specific right
to marital privacy was raised to that plane. The problem with
this constitutional right to privacy is that it merely replaces the
nebulous "liberty" with the equally nebulus "privacy." Just as
one has no absolute right to "liberty," he has no absolute right to
"privacy." Standards must still be developed and whether called
privacy or liberty, Brandeis' "right to be let alone" is probably
the functional equivalent of Mill's right to act as one will short of
harming others.
In addition to the protection of privacy which in application
appears to be synonomous with Mill's liberty, the Court has applied
the Mill criteria in reverse. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,59 for example, the Supreme Court held individual liberties to
be limited when in conflict with the rights of others.6 0 They reversed a court of appeals' holding that radio commercial messages on public vehicles invaded the realm of privacy protected
for each individual by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, stating: "The liberty of each individual in a public vehicle or
public place is subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the
rights of others." 61 It is not extreme to argue that those same liber56. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
57. Id. at 478.
58. Dixon, supra note 43; Dykstra, "The Right Most Valued by Civilized
Man," 6 UTAH L. REv. 305 (1959); Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone,
55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960) ; McKay, supra note 19.
59. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

60. Id. at 465.
61. Id.
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ties would have been protected if the rights of others had not been
involved. Some state courts have, in fact, voided laws specifically because they entered the realm of individual liberty as
defined by Mill. 62 These facts lead to the conclusion that courts
have applied the Mill criteria in the past, but generally have
only stated their conclusions. Thus, John Stuart Mill is not
alien to judicial decisions. When a court finds a right to "privacy" or "to be let alone," it is simply stating a conclusion. The
determination was likely based on a reasoning process similar to
that suggested by Mill in On Liberty. When a court suggests
that an individual right must be limited when in conflict with
the rights of others, it is implying the right deserves a higher order of protection when it affects the individual alone. Finally,
use of this analysis by state courts means that Mill's philosophy
was not unknown to the common law, and the Constitution must
be interpreted in light of the common law.6 3 In short, John Stuart Mill in On Liberty provides a workable standard by which
to determine those rights which are preferred under the ninth
amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

The major dilemma of the twentieth century "is the growing
tension between the assumed necessity for a strong state largely
devoted to the achievement of social welfare ends and the equally
pressing need to preserve the individual from the gathering forces
of big government. '6 4 In a nation with judicial review the courts
must play an active role in drawing the line between these competing forces. The belief that this is a "political" problem which
should be left to the legislature is unsound. The courts provide
the only forum in which a single individual can be heard. The
legislature on the other hand is a forum for the majority. It
responds to the collective will of the citizens and is an eminently
inappropriate place for an individual to challenge a law enacted
for the collective welfare.
To resolve this dilemma courts must not only provide a forum
for the assertion of rights but must reevaluate and redefine the
constitutional bases of protected rights. That is, they must define
the constitutional realm of individual liberty. This comment suggests that unenumerated rights can derive protection from two
sources in the Constitution. Either the ninth amendment or the
due processs clauses may provide protection from state infringement on an individual course of conduct. While these sources of
protection coexist, they are not coequal and a law which infringes
62. Comment, Limiting the State's Police Power: Judicial Reaction to
John Stuart Mill, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (1970).

63. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 450 (1905).
64. McKay, supra note 19, at 279.

NUMBER 3]

UNENUMERATED RIGHTS

upon a ninth amendment right should merit greater scrutiny
than one which invades a right favored by the due process clause.
Since history has denied the ninth amendment substance, this
comment offers one standard for a determination of those rights
which it protects. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty provides a criterion for determining whether an individual activity is subject
to state control. Oversimplified, any activity is protected which
affects only the actor as long as the actor is of sound mind and
has reached his majority. More explicitly, the state cannot invade
the realm of conscience or tastes; nor can it interfere with an individual's right to plan his own life short of interfering with
others. Nevertheless, Mill is not offered as an absolute, and establishing that a right satisfies this criterion merely rebuts the presumption that a law infringing on it is constitutional and places
the burden of establishing why the statute should not be voided
on the state. Several factors, such as extreme governmental necessity or a history of prohibition might satisfy the state's burden.
For example, a statute prohibiting adult sexual activity in private would not be presumed to be constitutional. By showing
a history of prohibition of certain private sexual activity, however,
the government would satisfy its burden and a law prohibiting
those activities would be upheld. Such a history would, of course,
have to have roots reaching back into the common law at least as far
back as the time of the adoption of the Constitution. History is
of value only insofar as it rebuts the presumption that the asserted right was meant to be protected by the ninth amendment.
If the state cannot show historic justification for the challenged
law, it must show that the law is justified by a compelling state
interest and that the need cannot be satisfied in a less offensive
manner. If the government fails to meet these requirements, the
challenged statute must be voided by authority of the ninth
amendment.
If an individual challenges a law as violative of his rights and
the right infringed does not merit protection under the ninth
amendment, the court should apply the traditional substantive due
process criteria. The court must look at the statute and determine if it is, in its opinion, reasonably calculated to effectuate a
legitimate government concern. Case law will eventually lead to
some degree of certainty as to which governmental concerns are
legitimate and which laws are well calculated to effectuate these
concerns. The specter of Lochner should result in greater restraint today but not an absolute refusal to act. To refuse to act
for fear of abusing its power would be to deny the Court its proper
65
role in our system.
The Griswold fact situation will illustrate the viability of these
theories. If the criteria proposed by this comment were applica65. Kauper, supra note 18, at 258.
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ble, the question presented would have been: does the state have
the right to deny a married couple the right to plan their
family? Surely this right meets the Mill criterion and is protected by the ninth amendment. Two adults are willfully determining their own destiny without affecting others. Thus the
Mill test is met and the state could never bar such a right because
it is protected by the ninth amendment. The problem in this case
is that the state does not deny this right per se, but denies it de
facto by refusing to allow married couples the information
needed to make a rational decision and the means to carry out their
decision. Since the effect of the law is to deny a ninth amendment right, it is not presumed constitutional and unless the state
can prove an extreme justification, it must be voided insofar as it
applies to married couples.
Supposing that there were no ninth amendment rights involved,
the Court should have proceeded as Justices White and Harlan
did. 66 It should have looked for a legitimate state concern, which
in this case was the control of premarital sexual activity, and then
determined if the statute was reasonably calculated to effectuate
this goal. Certainly the denial of information to married couples
could have no effect on nonmarried persons. The law was, therefore, an unreasonable infringement on the rights of married couples in violation of the due process clause.
There is, of course, danger in the Court's entering new constitutional waters and announcing unenumerated protected rights,
but the times leave little room for judicial timidity. At a time
when the government needed powers to act, an infant Court
under Marshall was ready to find those powers. Today, the individual needs protection from that very government and if the
Court does not provide that protection, individual liberty may
be eroded. It would be tragic if in interpreting a document steeped
in notions of individual liberty the Court could not find a protected
realm of liberty. Our heritage demands the preservation of individual liberty.
GEORGE E. GARVEY

66. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (concurring opinions).
The distinctive feature of Mr. Justice White's opinion, apart from
the fact that it is a clear articulation of the substantive rights interpretation of due process, is the care with which he examines the
Connecticut law in determining whether any rational consideration appropriate to matters of public concern justifies the restriction.

